

Jo Guldi and David Armitage. *The History Manifesto*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. x + 175 pages.

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The History Manifesto is, as its name suggests, a call to arms. It offers readers a lively survey of directions past and present in the field of history and raises thought-provoking questions about the relevance and place of history today. Authors Jo Guldi and David Armitage argue that the discipline of history has lost touch with the world it purports to study and the concerns of the people who live there. They also argue that there are moves afoot which offer a solution to this problem, namely the rise of Big Data and the development of new methodologies that allow historians to put it to work in their scholarship.

The book begins with a survey of twentieth century historiography, tracing the evolution of methodologies in the field of history through their various “turns” and connecting them to the circumstances of their times, developments in other disciplines, and their political consequences today. Much of this focuses on the rise, fall, and ultimate return of long-term historical thinking. The authors argue that, in the first half of the twentieth century, history with a long-term focus made historians and history departments key players in their universities, in policy circles, and among the public. A number of factors, including the exponential growth of the educational sector after World War II, drove historians in the 1960s and 1970s towards more narrowly period or episode-specific studies based on archival research. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, as historians specialized “more and more about less and less” (p. 49), Guldi and Armitage argue that they ultimately lost both the inclination and ability to connect their work to the grand narratives of longer-term history. In doing so, they also lost the ability to relate their work to the work of other scholars, to the concerns of the public, and to the needs of governments and other institutions.

The first two chapters detail this rise and fall, and offer a more engaging account of twentieth century historiography and its disciplinary context

than most books specifically devoted to the subject. And this is perhaps one of the book's great strengths: it sets out to make history relevant. Some critics have found fault with this, saying that history never lost its relevance in the way Guldi and Armitage describe.¹ But the authors' concerns with relevance will resonate with the experience of many professionals in the field of history, and with that of others in the social sciences and humanities more broadly. Students fall asleep in our classes. We sometimes fall asleep in colleagues' lectures. Our graduate students have difficulty relating their work to its broader context and to work in other disciplines. Even the guidelines for book reviews in academic journals stress that reviewers need to "try their best" to write "in a way that engages all readers, not just those within the bounds of a particular specialty." This indicates that it is not just the graduate student being pilloried at his or her thesis defense that could use some help on this score, but likely also the professors doing the pillorying.

Guldi and Armitage offer their solution to this problem in the third and fourth chapters of their book, which deal respectively with how historians over the last two decades have begun to use Big Data to re-establish the connection between their work, longer-term historical trends, and questions of popular concern, and with some of the methodological issues involved in such projects. Regardless of how one feels about their argument in the previous two chapters, the third chapter constitutes a useful review of recent historical studies that incorporate Big Data into research on the topical questions of climate change, international governance, and economic inequality—a useful read for students and scholars interested in new directions in recent historical scholarship. The final chapter deals with the problems and prospects entailed by a turn to Big Data for historians, and it is this chapter that raises the biggest questions for the discipline.

The authors argue that historians everywhere are confronted with a choice either to use Big Data to maintain their relevance or to ignore it at their peril. To summarize, the archives that multiple generations of historians once whiled away their lives in are increasingly becoming digitized, accessible from the comfort of home. This fact, combined with data sourced from other areas, including environmental and archaeological evidence, means that there is a wealth of data readily available on a wide range of subjects going back incredibly far into the past. The advent of new data-mining technologies like keyword searchers, Google Ngrams, and personalized electronic archive systems like Paper Machines, coupled with

1 For example, Deborah Cohen and Peter Mandler, "The History Manifesto: A Critique," *American Historical Review* 120/1 (April 2015): 530-42.

developments in text-recognition software that makes digitalized sources searchable, means that everyone has at their fingertips the ability to analyze this data in seconds rather than over the course of lifetimes.

Historians, they argue, are by training (and years of work in the archives) better than others at “noticing institutional bias in the data, thinking about where data come from, comparing data of different kinds, resisting the powerful pull of received mythology, and understanding that there are different kinds of causes” (pp. 107-108). They are also more attuned to the role played by bureaucracies as the producers of a great amount of this data. If historians do not jump in to set the agenda and establish standards in the use of all of this newly available data, others will, and will likely do so in a methodologically problematic way.

Guldi and Armitage focus on the English-speaking world and its scholarship, but their argument about the significance of Big Data has important ramifications for non-Western scholarship. The most important of these relates to the issue of what might be termed hemispheric lag. While a great number of Western periodicals and government archives have been digitized, text-recognized, and made available to researchers for free online, this process has been uneven in other parts of the world. When last I checked, the Amazon Kindle still does not have the ability to properly render modern Turkish characters on its screen, let alone Ottoman Turkish characters in the Arabic script. While the digitization of the Hakkı Tarık Us Collection at the Beyazıt State Library in 2010 means that a wide range of Ottoman periodicals are now accessible online, the current state of text-recognition software does not yet allow for them to be searchable. Furthermore, the records of many non-Western bureaucratic entities are not as open to researchers as those of official bodies in the West, meaning that even if the technologies were available the records to use them on might not.

In short, there is an implicit Western bias in the wave of technological innovation that has made Big Data such an important potential player on the historical scene. This bias is natural. Technology eventually catches up, and bureaucratic hurdles relating to access may eventually be surmounted. But for the foreseeable future the fact of this lag will have important consequences for historians. If the easy accessibility of more and more sources means that historians will move to craft larger narratives covering greater spans of time in broader geographical scope, the greater accessibility of certain types of sources over others means that these historical narratives will inevitably give greater voice to Western over non-Western perspectives.

While *The History Manifesto* signals an important trend in research in the West, it also raises the specter of an “Asiatic Mode” of data production and the problem of how to incorporate such data into broader historical narratives that tie together data from multiple periods and regional contexts. Nevertheless, the book is an eminently readable and thought-provoking account of the broader repercussions of the various historical turns of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, a helpful survey of recent work utilizing new methodologies for incorporating Big Data into historical research, and a healthy warning to students and scholars of history on the importance of relating their work to the big picture and broader public.

Johannes Fried. *The Middle Ages*. Çev. Peter Lewis. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2015. xi + 580 sayfa.

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Ortaçağ tarihine ilişkin genel tarih kitaplarının yerini oldukça sıkıcı monografilere bıraktığı son yıllarda Avrupa'nın geleneksel olarak karanlık adedilen çağının bütün veçhelerine temas edecek ve üslubuyla okuyucuyu kendine çekebilecek bir esere duyulan ihtiyaç kendini göstermektedir. Ortaçağ üzerine çalışan birçok tarihçi, özellikle XX. yüzyılın ikinci yarısında genel Ortaçağ Avrupa tarihi kitapları yazmış olsalar da, Richard W. Southern'ın şiirsel bir dille kaleme aldığı *The Making of the Middle Ages* (1953) gibi okuyucuyu heyecanlandırabilecek ve ona geniş bir perspektif kazandırabilecek büyük bir eser ortaya koyamamıştı. Amerika'daki Ortaçağ tarihi çalışmalarında ise Norman Cantor'dan sonra pek büyük bir yetenek çıkmadı ve bu çalışmalar kültürel çalışmalar disiplinine hapsedildi. Amerikan akademik tarihçiliğinde her geçen gün değer kaybeden Ortaçağ Avrupa tarihi, ona hak ettiği değeri verecek tarihçiyi kendi anavatanında buldu.

Son dönem Alman Ortaçağ tarihçiliğinin Gerd Althoff ile birlikte önde gelen iki isminden biri olan Johannes Fried'in 2009'da, Alman okuyucuyu göz önünde bulundurarak kaleme aldığı *Das Mittelalter* başlıklı eseri,