The Possibility of a Realist Phenomenology

Speculative realism as a philosophical movement criticizes phenomenology by labeling it as “correlationist”. Behind this criticism, there is an understanding that phenomenology has a transcendental structure. I argue that phenomenology cannot be defined only under this particular conception of transcendental structure and there is a possibility of realist phenomenology. Phenomenology can offer a realist version of itself through its own possibilities, which Claude Romano, one of the contemporary phenomenologists, calls “descriptive realism”. In this article, first, I examine the concept of “correlationism” used by speculative materialists and realists to address phenomenology. Then I discuss the problematic nature of phenomenology's transcendental-idealist structure. After explaining that phenomenology does not necessarily have to present a transcendental structure by referring to Claude Romano's project of descriptive realism, I briefly compare the realism of the speculative movement with Romano's phenomenological realism. This brings us to deal with what extent the critique of correlationism can be valid for this new understanding of phenomenology.

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